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Abstract
In this note we extend Radner’s ([6]) result on the revealing properties
of a rational expectations equilibrium to the case of an infinite dimen-
sional probability space. Radner’s auxiliary proposition, which states
that the set of probability assessments leading to the same equilibrium
price is negligible, is generalised to the infinite dimensional case. In
the original paper a set is negligible if its closure has Lebesgue mea-
sure zero in RN , while in our setting a set is negligible if it is a meagre
subset of some topological space.
Introduction
In [6], Radner studies the revealing properties of a rational expectations
equilibrium in a fairly general model of a two-period market model in a
finite dimensional probability space. His auxiliary proposition states that
situations where equilibrium prices fail to reveal the agents’ information are
”rare” in the sense that the set of different probability assessments leading
to the same equilibrium price is negligible. A property that holds everywhere
except on a negligible set is said to hold generically. Hence we can say that
generically, different probability assessments lead to different equilibrium
prices. In Radner’s finite dimensional setting a set is negligible if its closure
has zero Lebesgue measure. Though the Lebesgue measure makes no sense
in an infinite dimensional space, the concept of genericity is well-defined for a
much wider class of topological spaces: A property is said to hold generically
in a Baire space if it holds everywhere except on a meagre subset, i.e. a set
that can be expressed as a countable union of sets that are nowhere dense.
Radner’s result has been generalised and extended in a variety of directions,
see e.g. [3] for an overview. The infinite dimensional case is studied in [1]
in a different setting from the present. In this note we remain quite true to
Radner’s original setting, with the following simplifications:
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• We do not allow heterogeneous beliefs. Our agents’ probability assess-
ments are given uniquely by their information or signal1.
• In our market model, short selling is allowed, cf. Remark 4.2.
The note is organised as follows: Section 1 introduces the probabilistic set-
ting and the financial market. Radner’s different equilibrium concepts are
modified to fit our present framework in Section 2. Section 3 deals with
spaces of conditional probability measures and the topological properties of
genericity and meagreness. The auxiliary proposition is stated and proved
in Section 4.
1 The agents and the assets
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space and assume that F is separa-
ble. The J stocks are traded at time 0 and has the F-measurable RJ -valued
time 1 payoff V . We let FV denote the σ-algebra generated by V and assume
that P (F ) > 0 for all non-empty F ∈ FV . There are I agents in the market.
Agent i receives an initial endowment (i) ∈ R+ of cash and e(i) ∈ RJ+ of
stocks. The agents’ utility functions are of the form
U0i(time 0 consumption) + Ui(time 1 wealth).
The agents’ time 0 decisions are based on their initial information given by
the σ-algebra2 G ⊆ F . Given an RJ -valued G-measurable asset price vector
φ, agent i’s choice of initial consumption c and portfolio of stocks z must
be R- and RJ -valued G-measurable random variables satisfying the budget
constraint
c+ φ>z ≤ (i) + φ>e(i) a.s. (1.1)
We will work under assumptions ensuring that the budget constraints hold
with equality and that the solution to the optimisation problem
max
z∈RJ
{
E
[
U0i
(
(i) + φ>(e(i) − z))+ Ui(V >z)∣∣G]} (1.2)
exists and is unique. Hence, given a G-measurable φ, z(i)(φ) : Ω → RJ
solving (1.2) is a G-measurable RJ -valued random variable. Throughout the
text, the collection z(1), . . . z(I) of agents’ demands will be denoted by the
shorthand (z(i)).
1For readers familiar with Radner’s paper, this amounts to studying P 2 in stead of
P 2I . For more on information vs. signal see Note 2
2Economists tend to prefer the term signal to describe an agent’s information - in our
setting G can thus be thought of as the σ-algebra generated by some signal function.
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2 Communicating equilibria and rational expecta-
tions equilibria
Definition 2.1 ((revealing) full communication equilibrium). A full com-
munication equilibrium is a collection {(z(i)), φ} of G-measurable RJ -valued
random variables such that for any i, z(i) solves (1.2) and the asset market
clears, i.e. ∑
z(i) =
∑
e(i) a.s. (2.1)
A full communications equilibrium is revealing if
σ{φ}∧FV = G∧FV . (2.2)
Note that (2.1) implies
∑
c(i) =
∑
(i) a.s. when the budget constraints
hold with equality.
Consider now the case where the agents come to the market with different
information G1, . . . ,GI and denote the pooled information
G := G1
∨
. . .
∨GI .
We could of course proceed naively and define a ”no communications equilib-
rium” as a collection {(z(i)), φ} of G-measurable RJ -valued random variables
such that z(i) solves (1.2) with G replaced by Gi for each agent and (2.1) holds.
But then we neglect the fact that a sophisticated trader could use the equilib-
rium prices to extract information about the other agents’ information. This
new information could in turn lead him to altering his demand for certain
stocks. But if the total market demand changes significantly, the price vector
is no more an equilibrium price vector. For a given RJ -valued G-measurable
asset price vector φ, consider in stead the optimisation problem
max
z∈RJ+
{
E
[
U0i
(
(i) + φ>(e(i) − z))+ Ui(V >z)∣∣Gi∨σ{φ}]}. (2.3)
Definition 2.2 (rational expectations equilibrium). A rational expectations
equilibrium is a collection {(z(i)), φ} of G-measurable RJ -valued random vari-
ables such that for any i, z(i) solves (2.3) and (2.1) holds.
Clearly, a revealing full communications equilibrium is also a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium.
3 Conditional probabilities
In the sequel, we shall deal with σ-algebras only indirectly via their con-
ditional probabilities, or more precisely their conditional probabilities re-
stricted to FV . Let P (·|G) denote a regular version of the conditional proba-
bility (cf. e.g. [4, Chapter VIII], [2, Section 33]). This measure is absolutely
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continuous with respect to P which implies that the restriction of P (·|G) to
FV is absolutely continuous with respect to the restriction P |FV on (Ω,FV ).
We let P denote the set of probability measures on (Ω,FV ) that are abso-
lutely continuous with respect to P |FV . Fix some q ∈ RJ , µ ∈ P and
consider
max
ζ∈RJ
{
U0i
(
(i) + q>(e(i) − ζ))+ ∫
Ω
Ui(V >ζ)dµ
}
. (3.1)
We say that q ∈ RJ is an equilibrium price for µ if the collection (ζ(i)) of
solutions to (3.1) satisfies ∑
ζ(i) =
∑
e(i).
Definition 3.1 (confounding probability measures). The measures µ, ν ∈ P
are confounding if they have a common equilibrium price.
Lemma 3.1. The collection {(z(i)), φ} of G-measurable RJ -valued random
variables is a full communication equilibrium if and only if for any i and
almost all ω, z(i)(ω) solves (3.1) with q = φ(ω) and µ = P |FV (·|G)(ω), and
(2.1) holds. Moreover, the equilibrium is revealing if the conditional probabil-
ity measures corresponding to different sets in G∧FV are non-confounding.
Proof. The first assertion follows from the fact that with the given q and
µ, (3.1) is simply (1.2) pointwise. If the conditional probability measures
corresponding to different sets in G∧FV are non-confounding, then
σ{φ} ⊇ G∧FV .
Hence, as φ is G-measurable, (2.2) must hold.
Example 3.1 Suppose that J = 2, F = σ{F1, F2, F3}, P (Fi) > 0, i =
1, . . . , 3 and
V (ω) =

[
2 1
]>
ω ∈ F1[
1 2
]>
ω ∈ F2[
3
2
3
2
]>
ω ∈ F3
Suppose that each agent’s utility functions and endowments coincide, i.e.
U0i ≡ Ui ≡ U and (i) ≡ , e(i) ≡ e, given by
U(x) = 2
√
x, x > 0,
 =
4
3
, e =
[
1 1
]>
.
In this case q =
[
1 1
]> is a (no-trade) equilibrium price for any probability
measure µ with µ(F1) = µ(F2). Hence any couple of probability measures
assigning the same probability to F1 and F2 is confounding.
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As Example 3.1 shows, one cannot in general rule out the occurence of
confounding probability measures. It is possible, however, to show that
the set of confounding measures is negligible. In the finite dimensional
case studied in [6] with N denoting the number of states, P is the N − 1-
dimensional unit simplex3 ∆N−1 equipped with the Lebesgue measure on
RN−1 and the auxiliary proposition states that the set of confounding couples
is negligible in the sense that its closure has zero Lebesgue measure in ∆⊗2N−1.
In a topological space a set is referred to as meagre if it can be expressed
as a countable union of nowhere dense sets, i.e. sets for which the interior
of the closure is empty. The complement of a meagre set is referred to as
a residual set. A topological space is a Baire space if any residual set is
dense. A property is said to hold generically in a Baire space if it holds on a
residual subset. Any countable intersection of residual sets in a Baire space
is in turn a residual set (cf. e.g. [5, Lemma 48.1]). Consequently, countable
selections of generic properties hold simultaneously on a residual set and are
thus generic. According to the Baire category theorem (cf. e.g. [5, Theorem
48.2]), any complete metric space is a Baire space.
Lemma 3.2. P equipped with the metric
d(µ, µ′) := sup{|µ(F )− µ′(F )|; F ∈ FV }. (3.2)
is a complete metric space.
Proof. Let (µn) be a Cauchy sequence in P and consider
µ(F ) := lim
n→∞µn(F ), F ∈ F .
Clearly µ(Ω) = 1, µ(∅) = 0 and for any disjoint sets F, F ′ ∈ F we have
µ(F unionsq F ′) = µ(F ) + µ(F ′). (3.3)
Suppose further that (Am) is a sequence of elements of F such that Am ↓ ∅.
Fix some δ > 0, and note that
• by the Cauchy property there exists some N ≥ 0 such that
d(µN , µn) <
δ
2
, n ≥ N,
• by the ”continuity from above” property of probability measures ( [2,
Theorem 2.1 (ii)]) there exists some M ≥ 0 such that
µN (Am) <
δ
2
, m ≥M.
3As Radner allows heterogeneous beliefs his P is more correctly identified by ∆IN−1
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Hence
µn(Am) < µN (Am) + d(µN , µn) < δ, m ≥M, n ≥ N.
and
lim
m→∞µ(Am) = 0. (3.4)
Suppose that (Fk) is a sequence of disjoint elements of FV and define
F :=
⊔
Fk.
Defining
Am :=
⊔
k>m
Fm = F\
⊔
k≤m
Fm,
we have that Am ↓ ∅ as m→∞, and by (3.3) and (3.4)
µ(F ) =
m∑
k=1
µ(Fk) + µ(Am) = lim
m→∞
m∑
k=1
µ(Fk).
Hence µ is a probability measure on (Ω,FV ). As
µn(F ) = 0∀n =⇒ µ(F ) = 0,
we have that µ << P, i.e. µ ∈ P.
As indicated in the Introdution our aim is to prove that the set of confound-
ing probability measure is meagre in the product space P⊗2 := P ×P. The
following lemma shows that we may, without loss of genericity, consider only
probability measures that are equivalent to P |FV , i.e. belonging to the set
P+ of probability measures such that µ(F ) > 0 for all F ∈ FV for which
P (F ) > 0.
Lemma 3.3. P+ is a residual subset of P in the topology induced by the
metric d.
Proof. Clearly for any F ∈ FV the set
P0(F ) := {µ ∈ P; µ(F ) = 0}
is closed in P. For any µ ∈ P0(F ) and any δ > 0 there exists some µ′ ∈
P0(F )C such that d(µ, µ′) < δ. Hence, the interior of (the closure of) P0(F )
is empty and the set is nowhere dense. As FV is separable, PC+ is a countable
union of nowhere dense sets and hence meagre.
Remark 3.1. With the topology induced by the Lebesgue measure on RN−1,
a set in ∆⊗2N−1 whose closure has zero measure is clearly meagre.
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4 The auxiliary proposition
For the auxiliary proposition to hold true we make the following assumptions
regarding the agents’ utility functions and endowments, the final payoffs and
the possible equilibria:
Assumption 4.1. For every agent i,
• U0i, Ui are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave, and
• U ′0i(c)→∞ and U ′i(c)→∞ as c→ 0
Assumption 4.2. Denoting e˜(i) := [(i) e(i)>]> we have that
• e˜(i) ∈ RJ+\{0} for every i and
• the sum has only strictly positive components, denoted∑ e˜(i) ∈ RJ++.
Assumption 4.3.
1. V is bounded from above and away from zero below, in all components
a.s.
2. None of the assets are redundant, i.e. there is no non-zero x ∈ RJ
such that
V >x = 0 a.s.
3. In equilibrium there is no collection (x(i)) ∈ (RJ)I such that∑
V >x(i)U ′i(V
>z(i)) = 1 a.s.
Remark 4.1. These assumptions correspond roughly to the assumptions
(A1)-(A3) in [6]. The assumption that U ′i(c) → ∞ as c → 0 is added to
ensure the existence of a solution to the agents’ optimisation problem in the
case were short-selling is allowed. Part 3 of Assumption 4.3 is stronger in
our case, but we do think that this is necessary also in the original paper.
Regarding this part it may seem odd to make a priori assumptions about
the properties of an equilibrium. For a justification of this point, see [6, Ap-
pendix]. Radner also assumed that the market is incomplete. In the present
setting this does not seem to be necessary - it is of course the case when F
is infinite.
The auxiliary proposition. Under Assumptions 4.1-4.3, the set of con-
founding couples in P⊗2 is meagre.
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Before proving the auxiliary proposition we need to study the agents’ de-
mand functions. By the assumptions 4.1 and 4.3 (part 1), any equilibrium
price vector has only strictly positive components, i.e. q ∈ RJ++ and each
agent must exhaust his budget, i.e. (1.1) must hold with equality. Moreover,
any agent’s optimal portfolio must satisfy
q>z < (i) + q>e(i) and V >z > 0 µ-a.s. (4.1)
Given the asset price vector q ∈ RJ++, probability measure µ ∈ P and
portfolio z ∈ RJ+ such that (4.1) holds and U ′i(V >z) ∈ L1(FV , µ), agent i’s
expected marginal utility is given by the vector
Ψ(i)(z, q, µ) := −U ′0i
(
(i) + q>(e(i) − z))q + ∫
Ω
U ′i
(
V >z
)
V dµ.
The first-order condition for (3.1) is
Ψ(i)(z, q, µ) = 0
which has a solution thanks to Assumption 4.1. If µ ∈ P+ the matrix
DzΨ(i)(z, q, µ) : =
[
∂Ψ(i)
∂z1
. . . ∂Ψ
(i)
∂zJ
]
= U ′′0i
(
c(i)
)
qq> +
∫
Ω
U ′′i (V
>z)V V >dµ
where c(i) := (i) + q>(e(i) − z(i)) is negative definite because part 2 of
Assumption 4.3 ensures that for any non-zero x ∈ RJ
x>DzΨi(z, q)x = U ′′i0
(
c(i)
)
(q>x)2 +
∫
Ω
U ′′i (V
>z)(V >x)2dµ < 0.
Hence, the solution z(i) = z(i)(q, µ) to agent i’s optimisation problem is
unique. To investigate its sensitivity to changes in q, consider
DqΨ(i)(z(i), q, µ) : =
[
∂Ψ(i)(z(i),q,µ)
∂q1
. . . ∂Ψ
(i)(z(i),q,µ)
∂qJ
]
= −U ′0i(c(i))I− U ′′0i(c(i))q(e(i) − z(i))> +DzΨ(i)Dqz(i),
where I is the J × J identity matrix. As DzΨ(i) is negative definite and
hence nonsingular and
DqΨ(i)(z(i), q, µ) = 0
we have
Dqz
(i)(q, µ) = DzΨ(i)
−1(
U ′0i(c
(i))I+ U ′′0i(c
(i))q(e(i) − z(i))>
)
.
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Suppose that ν ∈ P+ is such that U ′i(V >z(i)) ∈ L1(FV , ν) as well. Then we
can define the directional derivative
Dµ,νΨ(i)(z(i), q, µ) : = lim
δ→0
1
δ
(
Ψ(i)
(
z(i)(q, (1− δ)µ+ δν), q, (1− δ)µ+ δν)
−Ψ(i)(z(i)(q, µ), q, µ))
= DzΨ(i)Dµ,νz(i) +
∫
Ω
U ′i(V
>z(i))V (dν − dµ).
Reasoning as above we have that
Dµ,νz
(i)(q, µ) = DzΨ(i)
−1
∫
Ω
U ′i(V
>z(i))V (dµ− dν).
Remark 4.2. In Radner’s paper, short selling is not allowed and the first-
order condition for (3.1) is
Ψ(i)j (z
(i), q, µ) = 0 if z(i)j > 0
Ψ(i)j (z
(i), q, µ) ≤ 0 if z(i)j = 0
The demand z(i)j can fail to be differentiable in q and/or µ only if
Ψ(i)j (z
(i), q, µ) and z(i)j = 0.
It is proved that this can only happen in equilibrium for a negligible set of
probability measures. In the infinite dimensional setting, we can prove that
this will only happen for a meagre set of probability measures.
Lemma 4.1. For any q ∈ RJ++ the set P(q) of probability measures for
which q is an equilibrium price is a meagre subset of P.
Proof. Suppose that (Pn) is an increasing sequence of closed sets in P+ such
that4
P+ =
∞⋃
n=1
Pn.
By the continuity properties of the z(i)’s, the set
Pn(q) :=
{
µ ∈ Pn;
∑
z(i)(q, µ) =
∑
e(i)
}
is closed. Suppose that Pn(q) has non-empty interior: then there exists some
open set B in Pn(q) such that for any µ, ν in B∑
Dµ,νz
(i)(q, µ) =
∑
DzΨ(i)
−1
∫
Ω
U ′i(V
>z(i))V s(dν − dµ) = 0,
4For given ν ∈ P+, Pn could be the set of µ’s in P such that µ(F ) ≥ 1nν(F ) for all
F ∈ FV
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which implies that there exists some y ∈ RJ such that∑
DzΨ(i)
−1
U ′i(V
>z(i))V = y a.s.
By part 2 of Assumption 4.3 any such y can have only non-zero components,
which in turn implies that part 3 is violated. Hence Pn(q) has empty interior
and
P(q) ⊆
∞⋃
n=1
Pn(q)
⋃
PC+
is meagre.
Lemma 4.2. For any µ ∈ P+, there is a countable number of equilibrium
prices.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the set of equilibrium prices is closed
and that any perturbation of the asset prices will bring the economy out of
equilibrium, i.e.
x>Dq
∑
z(i)(q, µ) = 0 ⇔ x = 0. (4.2)
The continuity of the agents’ demands as functions of q ensures that the set
of equilibrium prices is closed. As any equilibrium corresponds to a no-trade
equilibrium in the case where all agents have the endowment e(i) = z(i)(q, µ)
we may, without loss of generality assume this and consider∑
Dqz
(i)(q, µ) =
∑
DzΨ(i)
−1
U ′0i(c
(i)).
But this is a sum of positive definite matrices and hence non-singular and
(4.2) holds.
Proof of the auxiliary proposition. Let Qn ⊆ P⊗2 denote the set of con-
founding couples each belonging to Pn and such that their common equilib-
rium price is bounded componentwise by 1n from below and n from above.
The set of confounding couples is clearly contained in the union of
⋃Qn and
P⊗2+ C . As the latter is clearly meagre it is sufficient to show that all the Qn’s
are meagre. Suppose (µm, νm) is a sequence in Qn converging to (µ, ν). The
boundedness of the common equilibrium prices ensures that there is some
subsequence of these prices that converge to some q ∈ RJ whose components
are in [ 1n , n]. The continuity of the agent’s demands near an equilibrium en-
sures that q is a common equilibrium price for (µ, ν). The couple must then
belong to Qn, which is closed. By the Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, in any vicinity of
ν there is some ν ′ such that (µ, ν ′) is not confounding. Hence, the interior
of (the closure of) Qn is empty and the set is nowhere dense.
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